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The year 1975 saw a number of 
radical changes in the three countries 
making up Indochina. On April 17, 
1975 troops under the leadership of 
Pol Pot entered Phnom Penh and 
almost immediately introduced the 
extremely radical policies which 
marked the Khmer Rouge rule from 
1975 to 1979. 
Two weeks later on the April 30, 
1975 after a thirty-year war, North 
Vietnamese troops entered Saigon 
and, under communism, sought to 
unify Vietnam. 
Later that same year, in December 
of 1975, a less radical political change 
took place in Laos and that country, 
too, came under communism. 
These changes resulted in massive 
outflows of people seeking asylum. 
Thailand, sharing common borders 
with both Cambodia and Laos, 
became a host to refugees from both 
Laos and Cambodia as well as large 
numbers of Vietnamese who arrived 
by boat. 
This left Thailand in the 
unenviable position of having to 
support these uninvited populations 
until a solution could be found. 
Traditionally the office of the 
United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees takes a key role in situations 
such as this, but there was no office in 
Bangkok at that time and it was not 
until September, in response to an 
invitation by the Royal Thai 
Government, that the UNHCR 
established an office in Thailand. 
At the same time, a number of aid 
agencies representing the International 
community were looking to provide 
services to the refugee population in 
Thailand. 
In establishing services in a crisis 
situation and in the absence of a 
coordinating body, there is a risk of a 
number of problems occurring. 
Duplication of services, inappropriate 
services, lack of continuity, inadequate 
delivery of services are just a few of 
the risks involved in an "ad hoc" 
operation of this magnitude. 
In the recognition of these 
problems, seventeen agencies 
convened a series of meetings with the 
aim of establishing a coordinating 
body and a sectptariat whose function 
would be to liaise with various offices 
of the Royal Thai Government, 
international organizations, including 
the UNHCR, and other non-member 
agencies. This body was called the 
Committee for the Coordination of 
Services to Displaced Persons in 
Thailand (CCSDPT.) 
This body currently has thirty- 
nine member agencies. Although the 
name indicates that it is a coordinating 
committee, in fact its real function is 
more one of providing and facilitating 
the flow of information. 
The autonomy of each member 
organization is respected and no 
attempt is made to impose any 
changes on organizations, but each 
organization actually undertakes to 
open every possible avenue of 
communication so that effective 
coordination does take place. 
Members represent twelve 
different countries, as well as 
Thailand, and member agencies meet 
monthly in two separate sessions. The 
first is a closed meeting where issues 
of current interest are raised. This is 
followed by an open session where 
Royal Thai Government agencies are 
present as well as international 
organizations, such as the UNHCR, 
the UN Border Relief Operation, the 
Intergovernmental Committee for 
Migration and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. 
In addition to these fora there are 
subcommittees which deal with 
specific areas, such as the Medical 
Subcommittee, the Education 
Subcommit tee, the Karen 
Subcommittee and, more recently the 
Cambodian Liaison Subcommittee. 
The charter that the NGOs have is 
clearly one of being service-providers 
and, as such, they cannot be involved 
in political policy formulation. 
Program philosophies 
The UNHCR has the mandate for 
finding solutions for refugees under its 
protection. Those solutions are 
threefold. 
a) Voluntary repatriation to the 
country of origin once the political 
situation has become stable. 
b) Integration in the country of first 
asylum where repatriation is not 
practicable. 
C) Resettlement in a third country as 
a result of negotiations between 
countries outside of the homeland 
and the countries of first asylum. 
In the case of the Indochinese, the 
numbers and political considerations 
were so great that for the first five 
years only the third solution was 
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employed as a durable solution. After 
that only the Lao cases were provided 
with the option of repatriation and, 
even then, only a few were able to 
return. Until recently, resettlement 
was regarded as the only realistic long- 
term solution for most cases. 
The nature of the NGO programs 
reflected this situation. Most people in 
refugee centres were geared for a life 
in the West. Education agencies 
taught, using Western curricula, 
the Paris talks between the Khmer 
factions in August of last year where 
the much hoped for political solution 
failed to materialize. 
It should be realized that, for the 
refugees and the displaced in 
Thailand, the NGOs are the "face of the 
West," for they provide the grassroots 
workers who have optimum contact 
with the refugees. For this reason it 
has been really vital that the NGOs 
address the problem of durable 
western languages. Predominantly 
English was taught in an effort to 
assist refugees to meet the language 
criteria for acceptance by the West. 
Skills training was geared to provide 
refugees with marketable skills in the 
employment arenas of the West and 
medical programs in the refugee 
centres mostly reflected the "clinic" 
model of the West. In the initial stages 
The new role 
those programs were realistic and for ... NGOS 
appropriate since resettlement was 
almost exclusivelv in Western should be 
countries (the unit& States, Canada, 
Australia and the European nations). 
In the past year, the focus has 
changed. Agencies have recognized 
the situation as being more conducive 
to voluntary repatriation, with the 
emphasis being on "voluntary." The 
Laotian repatriation program has 
operated more and more efficiently in 
the last twelve months and has 
attracted more and more Lao to apply 
as a result of intmased confidence. 
From the beginning of 1989, hopes 
were raised that a political solution 
would be found in Cambodia and the 
300,000 displaced Khmer inside 
Thailand would, at last, be able to 
repatriate. In order to better p q a r e  
for this eventuality, the NGOs, under 
the Coordination of the United 
Nations Border Relief Operation 
(UNBRO), implemented a new 
philosophy, Self-Management, under 
which the Khmer themselves took a far 
greater share of responsibility for the 
programs at a management and 
decision-making level. The programs 
still continue on this basis but the 
optimism that was seen for 
repatriation has receded as a result of 
involvement in 
general 
development 
for the entire 
oooulation. 
solutions. In continuing to act with a 
Western approach, on the assumption 
that people would be resettled, this, in 
turn, had a psychological effect on the 
refugee population who were geared 
mentally to believe that their only 
option was resettlement. In fact, for 
the vast majority, the 300,000 Khmer 
on the border, there is no question but 
that they will, one day, return to their 
country of origin. In gearing programs 
to the level of services, or, at least, the 
aims of services in their homeland, 
agencies mentally gear the camp 
populations for the realities of life at 
home and creating a positive attitude 
towards the concept of repatriation. 
Another positive development 
towards repatriation has been the 
number of agencies who, whilst 
maintaining a presence in the centres 
in Thailand, have established services 
and offices in the home countries. This, 
in addition to instilling some sort of 
confidence in refugees considering 
repatriation, also provides a source of 
vital information on conditions in the 
homeland, as many refugees and 
displaced people left a number of 
years ago and are essentially out of 
touch with the current situation. 
It can, therefore, be said that 
although the NGOs play - and 
should play - no role in an actual 
political solution, they should stay 
abreast of political changes and play 
some role in gearing refugees and the 
displaced for the solution that is most 
appropriate for them. 
Interaction with the 
various authorities 
In the early years the refugee 
centres were under the auspices of the 
Total Thai Armed Forces and 
coordination was through the Joint 
Operations Centre UOC). In order to 
obtain approval to operate in a refugee 
centw, each agency applied to the JOC 
outlining a program proposal and 
providing details of staffing and 
structure. Later, in the early 1980s, 
some of the centres, those away from 
strategic borders, came under the 
authority of the Ministry of the 
Interior. Currently all camps, with the 
exception of the Khmer border camps, 
come under this authority which 
requires agencies to follow the same 
type of procedure as did the JOC 
previously. 
All centres having people 
designated as refugees come under the 
protection of the UNHCR and each 
refugee centre has a central 
coordinator called a field officer. This 
person is responsible for overseeing 
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and assuming responsibility for all 
UNHCR programs. Many of the NGO 
programs in the centres are funded by 
the UNI-ICR and, as such, come under 
some supervision by the UNHCR field 
officer in the refugee centre, although 
there is a central program and 
administrative unit based in Bangkok 
which is responsible for the overall 
coordination of the programs. 
With the exception of two centres 
on the Khmer/Thai border, all centres 
in that area come under the 
coordinating authority of UNBRO as 
the people in these centres are not 
designated as refugees but are referred 
to as Displaced Persons. As such, in 
general, they are not eligible for 
resettlement nor for the protection 
which would normally be accorded to 
refugees under the UNHCR. In fact, 
the camp administration in this case 
comes under the various components 
of the coalition government as 
recognized by the United Nations. 
This government is made up of three 
factions, the ANS or Sihanoukists, the 
KPNLF, the Khmer Peoples National 
Liberation Front under a previous 
Khmer Prime Minister, Sonn San, and 
the Khmer Rouge. UNBRO is 
essentially a service provider to these 
factions which are viewed by the 
United Nations as a government in 
exile. The NGO organizations 
working in these centres do so on the 
understanding that they are serving a 
civilian population, for to do otherwise 
would implicate them politically. They 
are humanitarian organizations and 
cannot become politically involved at 
all. These NGOs are mostly funded by 
UNBRO and, as such, submit program 
proposals to this body for approval 
annually. As stated previously, 
UNBRO has instituted a policy of 
Khmer Self-Management; programs 
operating in these camps reflect this 
philosophy. 
A good example of this can be 
seen in the programs initiated by the 
organization Handicap International. 
Theirs is essentially a rehabilitation 
program for amputees, most of whom 
are war victims. The program is set up 
in such a way to teach amputees to 
make their own prostheses out of local 
materials - bamboo, old car t im  and 
plaster. Khmer technicians are trained 
alid, in turn, amputees go through a 
program which teaches them to make 
their own prosthetic limbs. By doing 
this, victims can home and still 
maintain the same level of care 
provided this side of the border and 
technicians are able to transfer the 
necessary skills to their homeland on 
return whilst being responsible for 
programs on this side of the border. 
Because of the obvious political 
neutrality of this program and its 
equally obvious appropriateness, it is 
accepted by all authorities in both 
UNBRO and the various Khmer 
administrations. 
border, 170 along the Kampuchean 
border, 94 along the Burmese border 
and 72 along the Malaysian border. 
Once again this is a program of 
cooperation. Supplementary funding 
for the program comes from various 
donor countries, the USA, Japan, West 
Germany, Canada, Taiwan, Sweden, 
Norway and Belgium. WEP/UNBRO 
distribute food and infrastructure 
support. 
The role of the NGOs in this 
program is to make services, which are 
available to the refugee/displaced 
persons populations in the camps, also 
available to the Thai villages in the 
region. Some agencies have 
established education and medical 
programs in the villages themselves. 
Beyond the client group 
For anyone who has visited the 
refugee centres, particularly the 
Khmer border camps, it becomes 
obvious that the local population is 
itself a needs group. A rural 
community living in the border 
mgions has the normal restrictions one 
would anticipate in a community 
distanced from main centres, but, in 
this case, due to the political situation 
manifested in frequent shellings, their 
social and economic situation has been 
destabilized. It is in this situation that 
the NGOs also have a role to play. 
Again, through UNBRO, a program 
has been established entitled the 
"affected Thai villages program." These 
are essentially compensatory 
programs which recognize the 
instability of the area and provide 
services to the local Thai population. 
The concept of the Affected Thai 
Villages Program originated with the 
the Royal Thai Government and was 
instituted in October 1978 to assist 
Thai villagers in the Thai Kampuchean 
border region for the above reasons. 
From 1981, the project was 
extended to the Thai/Lao, Thai/ 
Burmese and the Thai/Malaysian 
borders. In total, 578 villages, or some 
600,000 people, benefit from the 
program, 242 villages along the Lao 
Summary 
In essence, it could be said that the 
role of the NGOs in Thailand is to 
provide non-political relief and 
support services to displaced 
populations whilst either a 
resettlement solution is found through 
an appropriate agency or until a 
political solution is found enabling the 
displaced to rrtum safely. 
As repatriation becomes more of a 
possibility, there is a need for 
development programs to work in the 
countries of origin to assist the 
weakened economy. Several NGOs 
are in various processes of evaluation 
to determine whether or not they have 
a role in that development, and, if so, 
what changes need to be made to 
make their programs development- 
based rather than relief-based. At the 
same time, it is becoming increasingly 
obvious that these agencies should not 
exclusively serve the returnees, as this 
could only create tensions within the 
communities and further divide them 
from the existing populations. The 
new role for those NGOs should be 
involvement in general development 
for the entire population. 
Roger Fordham is the Executive 
Secl.etay of the CCSDPT in Bangkok. 
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